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Abstract: A Certificate Authority (CA) provides the critical authentication and security services for Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) which are used for the Internet and wired networks. In MANETs (wireless and ad hoc) there 
is an inability to offer a centralized CA to provide these security services. Recent research has looked to facilitate the 
use of CAs within MANETs through the use of a Distributed Certificate Authority (DCA) for wireless and ad hoc 
networks. This paper presents a number of different types of DCA protocols and categorizes them into groups based 
on their factors and specifications. The paper concludes by proposing the best DCA security services in terms of 
performance and level of security. 
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1. Introduction 
MANETs consist of mobile devices that are connected together via wireless links. MANETs 
suffer from a number of limitations including: the lack of any centralized topology; limited speed; 
and, portability [1]. Therefore, because of these limitations it is complicated to implement stable and 
powerful networks which are not vulnerable to different types of attacks [1, 2]. Using CAs as a 
powerful component of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in MANET networks should be a good 
solution in securing these kinds of networks by using a trusted third party for authenticating users 
[3]. Unfortunately, CAs are themselves vulnerable to compromise with potential for intruders to 
attack and subsequently sign certificates using the node’s own private key. 
Although a node can be defined as a CA, there are some problems with this approach which are 
related to the node's existence. If the CA node is removed from the MANET it will cause the entire 
network to be impacted. Furthermore, it is vulnerable to adversaries because it is a single and 
independent node that can be attacked easily. For the problem of availability Anderson et al. [4] 
suggested an approach in which CAs are assigned to the nodes repeatedly. While it seems that this 
technique may solve the availability problem (because the network will be working well as long as 
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there is just one node in the MANET), this approach may become unstable when the nodes are trying 
to find each other in the network. One solution is to utilize a Distributed Certificate Authority (DCA). 
In section 2 the concept of DCAs in MANETs is introduced. In section 3 Threshold Cryptography is 
described and section 4 compares and categorizes different types of DCAs. Finally, section 5 proposes 
the best DCA system for MANETs. 
2. Distributed Certificate Authority 
A Distributed Certificate Authority (DCA) system is defined in a situation that the private key 
of the CAs are distributed among the network’s nodes. All of the nodes in the MANET will have the 
public key of the CAs for verifying the signatures signed by CAs (i.e. shareholders that have to 
participate in issuing and verifying signatures [5]). A threshold is defined for the maximum number 
of shareholders in the procedure. Table 1 compares the difference between a DCA and the more 
traditional Centralized Certificate Authority (CCA). The table shows that adopting a distributed 
mode will affect the level of security, availability and reliability. 
Table 1. Comparison between CCA and DCA 
 CCA DCA 
Availability LOW HIGH 
Security HIGH LOW 
Performance HIGH LOW 
Scalability HIGH LOW 
User Mobility HIGH --- 
DCA Mobility LOW HIGH 
Validity of Certificate HIGH LOW 
There are many DCAs that have been designed for MANETs and these can be categorized into 
two groups: Partially Distributed Certificate Authority (PDCA) and Fully Distributed Certificate 
Authority (FDCA). 
In FDCA all the nodes are shareholders and can generate certificates. FDCA has the potential to 
be attacked and broken, since one intruder who can attack one or more nodes can enter the network. 
As Dhillon et al. [6] proposed this problem can be overcome by providing a powerful Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) to identify the compromised nodes. Moreover, a limited life time can be 
defined for the certificates so that after expiration the certificates cannot be used. It is necessary to 
decide between security and performance to choose a suitable expiration time. If large expiration 
times for certificates are chosen, security will weaken however if the expiration times are frequently 
renewed, it will cause a large amount of data transfer in the network that will result in over-heading. 
In an FDCA all the nodes in the network share the secret, while in PDCA, some specific nodes 
are generating certificates and a node can combine a small number of these shares to produce a valid 
certificate. It is necessary to have a powerful server in this approach that is responsible for selecting 
the nodes for secret sharing. Both approaches suffer from disadvantages with a key one being 
availability. It is difficult to ensure that all the nodes assigned for sharing the secret are available at a 
given time. There are also problems of performance and ensuring the suitability of nodes which are 
affected by many factors such as the scale of the network, level of security and also the architecture 
of the network. 
Table 2. Comparison between PDCA & FDCA 
 PDCA FDCA 
Security Higher than FDCA LOW 
Availability Lower than FDCA HIGH 
Scalability HIGH LOW 
Mobility Support LOW HIGH 
Network Size Large Small 
IDS Monitoring Not required Required 
Secret Updates Multicast Broadcast 
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3. Secret Sharing 
In a Distributed Certificate Authority, actions like generating a digital signature and certificates are 
distributed through the limited number of nodes so that the selected nodes are participating in doing 
these works. In Threshold Cryptography (TC) a (k, n) threshold is used that allows a CA’s certificate 
to be divided into n splits, where n is the total number of subgroup members and k<n shareholders 
can find the certificate by combining their own shared key that k-1 or fewer shareholders cannot do 
so [7]. In this approach, if the attacker could find the shared secret of few shareholders but less than 
k, they cannot recover the certificate. However, this approach will not work well if the attacker has 
found more than k. For this reason the secret sharing has to be updated by providing new set of 
shares periodically [8]. 
4. Secret Share Updating 
If attackers could find k shareholder and compromise them in a certain time, they could enter the 
whole network. So rather than shared secret splitting algorithms that are supposed to be secure, it 
seems that there is a need to update the shareholders in certain time intervals. In this case it is not 
necessary to change the secret key itself. The attackers must compromise k shareholders between the 
time intervals. Specifying update intervals has an effect on the security and performance of the 
network. Thus, if shorter times are chosen, it may result in an over-head on the network and also 
choosing a long time interval may reduce the security [9]. 
 
Figure 1. Distributed Certificate Authority Hierarchy. 
5. Distributed Certificate Authority Categories 
In Figure 1, different types of DCAs are categorized into 6. Because ad hoc networks are not very 
flexible in scalability and performance, Clustering can help to overcome these limitations. It can 
reduce the file storage in the nodes which are going to have the certificates of other nodes in clusters, 
rather than the whole network. Also, it can reduce the overall load of the network by dividing nodes 
into groups and provide more efficient certificate management. 
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A. Clustering based DCA schemes 
Chaddoud et al. [5] suggested a cluster based DCA in which certificates are distributed through 
Cluster Heads (CH) which are shareholders in the network. This ensures that none of the single 
cluster heads know the DCA and when a new cluster head joins the network, it has to be signed with 
the shared private key. In this case the new node sends its request to get the DCA’s share. Any cluster 
head which receives the request signs the key and provide a share for the new node. As soon as the 
node receives its shared key, it can get the full certificate on demand.  
 
Figure 2. Advantages of Clustering in PDCA. 
There is another cluster-based DCA which is proposed by Rao et al. [10] that categorizes the 
network’s nodes into 3 groups: Repository nodes; Client nodes; and, server nodes. In this scheme 
whole nodes are organized into clusters. From each cluster, some nodes are selected to be repository 
nodes and after that the server nodes are selected through repository nodes. When a new node enters 
the network, it has to contact a Registration Authority section. The Registration Authority section 
sends a request to the server nodes. The server nodes sign the certificate and resend it to the 
Registration Authority section and at the end the signed certificate will be given to the new node by 
the Registration Authority section. 
The problem with this approach is that the registration authority section was part of another 
wired network that was working dependently. However, the mobility of the nodes has been 
considered in this scheme so that they could handle any topology changes in the MANET [11]. 
The third scheme was proposed by Elhdhili et al. [12] in which the DCA is based on clustering, 
is totally distributed and uses a (k, n) threshold, RSA signed certificate to the group of cluster heads. 
In this approach there are 3 types of nodes which are: Administrator; Cluster Head; and, Cluster 
members. 
Another approach which is proposed by Lee et al. [13], is a partially distributed certificate 
authority that supports node mobility and movements. This approach is more scalable as it allows 
the nodes to authenticate each other. In this model creating certificates also takes less time despite 
the increased packet sizes. It is considered that the certificate creation procedure is not affected by 
the number of nodes that exist in the network, as the certificates are produced by the existing 
members and are not interrupted by nodes joining the cluster. 
Table 3. Properties of Cluster-based DCA Node Types CA storage Security Authentication Cluster & CH - CH share Updates - Client, Repository, Server Repository Nodes Revocation by CRL Registration Authority Administrator, CH, regular Administrator Nodes Secure inside cluster Nodes Participation 
B. Routing-based DCA 
The easiest way to send certificate messages through the whole of the network is by using 
broadcasting. However, this way of sending messages causes an increased over-head and reduces 
the MANET’s performance, so the recommended solution is to use Unicast protocols for DCA 
approaches. Unicast DCA protocols can be classified into three groups: reactive; proactive; and, 
hybrid protocols. 
Advantages of 
Clustering in PDCA 
CHs as servers Decreasing 
Overhead 
Repository for 
certificates 
Distinguish 
repository nodes 
Find other 
PDCAs 
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In one of the routing based DCAs proposed by Xia et al. [14] identity-based FDCA is used in a 
MANET which is more adequate for MANETs because it can reduce the overhead in the network. 
This model is based on proactive routing, however Sen et al. [15] suggested the Mobile Certificate 
Authority (MOCA) protocol which was more reliable and efficient than the original MOCA presented 
by Rao et al. [10]. 
Table 4. Properties of Routing based DCA Routing protocol Security Optimization  Proactive Routing  Utilize route cache Use Unicast Reactive Routing  - Change routing packets 
C. Self-Initializing Protocol 
One of the main issues in MANETs is the initialization and startup procedures. A self-initialized 
system is needed to begin its security related works on system boot time and to provide certificate 
authorities by using Self-Initializing Protocols (SIP). Ge et al. [16], proposed a self-initialized DCA 
which is more scalable, cost efficient and more secure. In this method all the factors and parameters 
required for DCA such as total members and threshold values will be defined. 
Kang et al. [17] suggested another scheme of Self-Initialized DCA (SDCA) in which the nodes 
that can distribute partial keys, are authenticated by a system authority section. 
D. Mobility Supported Schemes 
As it is critical to have enough nodes for creating certificates, the mobility and existence of the 
nodes will have an effect on a DCAs operations. Some methods have been proposed to be aware of 
the mobile nodes as described in the following sections.  
Pereira et al. [18] suggested a new mobility aware scheme in which a DCA system can adapt 
itself with the members’ existence and also provides availability and reliability for the DCA system. 
Joshi et al. [19] proposed a scheme that produces more shares for each node. As a result, certificates 
can be recreated with a smaller number of existing nodes. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mobility Schemes Hierarchy. 
E. Security-aware Schemes 
From a security point of view, there are some proposed DCA systems which are secure against 
various type of attacks in MANETs. Zhou et al. [20] proposed a method that is based on multiple key 
cryptography DCA system. Also, Rajaram et al. [21], Zeb et al. [22], Dhabi et al. [23] and Chaudhry et 
al. [24] suggested a powerful scheme that supports certificate updates for preventing various attacks. 
Figure 4 present techniques that can help to make DCA system more secure. 
6. Revised DCA System 
After studying the properties of an efficient MANET Certificate Authority there are some 
important factors to define in order to establish a powerful, secure and efficient DCA system for 
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MANETs. Chaddoud et al. [5] have suggested a scheme for DCA system. The following sections 
review these factors and add important issues which need to be considered in designing such 
systems.  
• Availability 
All the nodes in the network which are shareholders need to be available in the MANET. A good 
and efficient MANET should have solutions for the mobility and availability of the nodes and ensures 
that there are always enough shareholders to produce certificates. 
• Reliability 
MANETs by their nature are unreliable because of node mobility and their wireless 
communications.  
• Security 
One of the most important security issues in a MANET is avoiding a node acting as a single 
point of failure. For this purpose, secret sharing algorithms are used as well as certificate updating. 
 
Figure 4. Security Techniques in DCA. 
• Efficiency 
Some of the MANETs’ limitations are bandwidth, scalability and data communications through 
wireless media. These factors need to be carefully studied to design a powerful DCA system. 
• Fault tolerant  
A well-designed DCA system needs to ensure that all the components in the MANETs are 
continuing their own correct predefined tasks. There is also a need to have some monitoring control 
systems to detect any fault through the entire network. 
• Node Mobility 
There are some kinds of mobility in ad hoc networks that should be covered by a DCA system. 
One of these is a clients’ mobility inside their own clusters and even from one cluster to another one. 
Another mobility is the repository nodes’ mobility in the network or between two or more networks. 
•  Self-initialization 
This part can be studied from two points. The first one is designing an automatic system which 
can support all DCA tasks and another one is to have a self-initialization system which is going to 
make the DCA work well on network start up. 
• Coordination with network and integration 
A DCA system which is implemented on top of an ad hoc network needs to be adapted well 
with all the protocols used in wireless networking and especially in ad hoc networks. 
• Scalability 
The reliability and security of the networks will be reduced with the MANETs expansion. But 
there are some solutions that can be used to scale a DCA systems in MANETs without facing any 
problem or at least with fewer limitations. 
• Independence 
MANETs, like any other topologies, need to be independent from other infrastructure like wired 
networks because any reliance in distributed topologies like ad hoc networks will cause some 
problems. 
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• Storage efficiency 
Public key infrastructure needs a large amount of space for encryption and decryption, so it is very 
important to choose a suitable data structures to prevent any other problems caused by shortage of 
space. 
7. Conclusion 
With security playing a vital role in MANETs, there are many proposed methods to prevent attacks. 
One of the main security issues in MANETs is the Certificate Authority service. By using PKI it is 
possible to design a secure and efficient ad hoc network which is at least as secure as wired networks. 
In this paper different distributed certificate authorities were proposed to adapt PKI components for 
use in wireless networks. This classification enables a better understanding of the concepts and the 
identification of solutions for unsupported areas or less concentrated issues. 
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